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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Lan Tu Trinh appeals from an order of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which 
dismissed her complaint on the ground that the defendant, a 
court-appointed receiver, is immune from suit.  We will affirm, 
joining our sister courts in holding that court-appointed 
receivers are entitled to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity from 
suit when they act with the authority of the court. 
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I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
This case comes before us for the second time.  
Originally, Trinh filed a complaint in the District Court against 
David Fineman, who had been appointed by the Court of 
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County as a receiver in a case 
involving the dissolution of Trinh’s beauty school.  Her 
complaint alleged that Fineman did not give her a proper 
accounting of the escrow account related to that case and 
accused him of “the theft of [her] properties on behalf of the 
Court of Common Pleas for Kathleen Trinh’s [her sister’s] 
benefit.”  Compl. at *3, D.C. Dkt. No. 1.  The District Court 
sua sponte dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, explaining that Trinh had not raised “any claims 
arising under federal law or [alleged] that the parties are 
citizens of different states.”  June 3, 2019 Order at *1 n.1, D.C. 
Dkt. No. 3.  
 
In Trinh’s first appeal, we affirmed that her complaint, 
as filed, did not establish subject matter jurisdiction, but we 
remanded to allow Trinh the opportunity to amend her 
complaint.  Trinh v. Fineman, 784 F. App’x 116, 117 (3d Cir. 
2019) (per curiam). 
 
Her amended complaint again asserted federal question 
jurisdiction—this time on the ground that Fineman, as the 
receiver, was “abusing his state power.”  Am. Compl. at *3, 
D.C. Dkt. No. 10.  And again, the District Court dismissed the 
complaint.  Although it determined that Trinh’s complaint 
arguably raised a § 1983 claim, the Court held that Fineman, 
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as a court-appointed receiver, should be afforded quasi-judicial 
immunity.  It therefore granted his motion to dismiss.  See 
March 2, 2020 Orders, D.C. Dkt. Nos. 13 & 14.   
 
In the instant appeal, in addition to the parties’ regular 
briefing, we asked them to address: 
 
whether any of the acts of the Defendant, David 
Fineman, alleged in Trinh’s amended complaint, 
were outside the scope of the authority granted 
him by the Court of Common Pleas of 
Philadelphia County.  See Russell v. Richardson, 
905 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2018) (explaining that 
this Court uses a “functional approach” in 
determining whether quasi-judicial immunity 
should be applied). 
 
Clerk Order at *1, App. Dkt. No. 10.  That supplemental 
briefing is complete, and the case is now ripe for decision. 
 
II.   Discussion1 
 
Section 1983 establishes that “[e]very person who acts 
under color of state law to deprive another of a constitutional 
right [is] answerable to that person in a suit for damages.”  
 
1 The District Court wielded jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We exercise de novo review over a district court’s 
order granting immunity from suit.  Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 
F.3d 435, 439 (3d Cir. 2000).  
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Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (alterations in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  But despite its 
broad language, courts have consistently held that in enacting 
§ 1983, Congress did not intend to abolish the immunities 
recognized at common law.  Id.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that those immunities include absolute immunity 
for certain officials, acting in their official capacities, judges 
among them.  See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224–26 
(1988).  Today, we consider whether a state court-appointed 
receiver is also a type of official who would be immune from 
suit under common law. 
 
A.   Quasi-Judicial Immunity 
 
We conclude that the policies underlying judicial 
immunity similarly support immunity for state court-appointed 
receivers.  The adjudicative function that judges perform 
requires that they be immune from suit for damages, see Stump 
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978), for “[i]f judges 
were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting 
avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would 
provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering 
decisions likely to provoke such suits,” Gallas v. Sup. Ct. of 
Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Forrester, 484 
U.S. at 226–27).  And that immunity extends to all judicial 
decisions, unless they were taken “in the clear absence of all 
jurisdiction.”  Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 (quoting Bradley v. 
Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351 (1871)).  Erroneous, controversial, 
and even unfair decisions do not divest a judge of immunity.  




When the nature of an official’s functions is akin to that 
of a judge, we extend a similar immunity—quasi-judicial 
immunity.  Keystone Redevelopment Partners, LLC v. Decker, 
631 F.3d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 2011).  As in the context of judicial 
immunity, we consider “the official’s job function, as opposed 
to the particular act of which the plaintiff complains.”  Dotzel 
v. Ashbridge, 438 F.3d 320, 325 (3d Cir. 2006).  Applying this 
logic, courts have extended quasi-judicial immunity to several 
roles closely associated with judges, such as federal hearing 
examiners, administrative law judges, federal and state 
prosecutors, and grand jurors.  Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 
193, 200 (1985).   
 
In this case, our examination persuades us that a 
receiver, too, functions as an “arm of the court.”  Hughes v. 
Long, 242 F.3d 121, 127 (3d Cir. 2001).  Courts appoint 
receivers in litigation to take charge of property at issue, and a 
receiver “has no powers except such as are conferred upon him 
by the order of his appointment and the course and practice of 
the court.”  Atl. Tr. Co. v. Chapman, 208 U.S. 360, 371 (1908).  
For that reason, the Supreme Court has observed, the 
appointment of a receiver causes the property at issue in the 
litigation to “pass[] into the custody of the law, and 
thenceforward its administration [is] wholly under the control 
of the court by its officer or creature, the receiver.”  Id. at 370.   
 
And in recognition of the receiver’s relationship to the 
court, our sister circuits have concluded that a court-appointed 
receiver is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.  See Kermit 
Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 
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1, 2–3 (1st Cir. 1976); Bradford Audio Corp. v. Pious, 392 F.2d 
67, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1968); Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 373 
(5th Cir. 1995); Smith v. Martin, 542 F.2d 688, 690–91 (6th 
Cir. 1976); New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 
1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1989); T & W Inv. Co. v. Kurtz, 588 F.2d 
801, 802 (10th Cir. 1978); Prop. Mgmt. & Invs., Inc. v. Lewis, 
752 F.2d 599, 603–04 (11th Cir. 1985); cf. Med. Dev. Int’l v. 
Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 585 F.3d 1211, 1222 (9th Cir. 
2009) (declining to extend immunity to claim against court-
appointed receiver in his official capacity while managing an 
enterprise in receivership).  Pennsylvania law also reflects that 
understanding, defining a court-appointed receiver as a 
“judicial officer.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 102; see also Gior 
G.P., Inc. v. Waterfront Square Reef, LLC, 202 A.3d 845, 856 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019) (noting that “[a] receiver is considered 
an officer and agent of the court that appoints the receiver”).  
 
B.   Fineman’s Official Functions  
 
 In this case, the District Court properly concluded that 
Fineman is the beneficiary of that quasi-judicial immunity.  
After careful review of the record and the briefs on appeal, we 
conclude that the District Court did not err in dismissing 
Trinh’s complaint.  Fineman was duly appointed by the state 
court and the transcript of the state court hearing reflects that 
the judge was aware of, and approved of, all of his 
expenditures.2  And the state court’s opinion makes plain that 
 
2 The transcript is not in the District Court record, but 
Fineman submitted the transcript on appeal, and when 
reviewing a district court’s decision, we may “consider matters 
8 
 
“[t]he fees provided to [Fineman] from the escrow account 
were reasonable and were approved by the court,” and that 
“[a]ny expenditures made were pursuant to either the terms of 
the settlement agreement, to satisfy outstanding legal fees, or 
pursuant to the winding-down of the business.”  State Court 
Op. at *2, D.C. Dkt. No. 11-3.  Thus, quasi-judicial immunity 
is warranted because Fineman was acting in all relevant 
respects “at the court’s request.”  Russell, 905 F.3d at 247–48. 
 
Trinh’s arguments to the contrary are in reality a 
disagreement with the outcome of Fineman’s court-ordained 
actions and, even then, are not supported by the record.  In 
contrast to her protestations here, Trinh “ha[d] been offered the 
opportunity to inspect the receiver’s books multiple times” but 
“refused to take it.”  State Court Op. at *2, D.C. Dkt. No. 11-
3.  And Trinh has not shown that Fineman acted outside of his 
authority in any way, so the policy behind immunity for 
receivers “to prevent vexing suits against public officials” who 
are simply performing their duties, Kermit, 547 F.2d at 3, 
applies here.   
 
III.   Conclusion 
 
Because Fineman is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity 
for his court-ordered activities, the District Court did not err in 
dismissing Trinh’s complaint, and we will therefore affirm the 
District Court’s judgment. 
 
of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and 
items appearing in the record of the case.”  Keystone, 631 F.3d 
at 95 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
